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Abstract
We analyse a model of vertical diﬀerentiation focusing on the trade-oﬀ be-
tween entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, ver-
sus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product.
We show that there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with
a lower quality than the follower, for low discount factors, for high costs of
quality and for low consumers’ willingness to pay for quality.
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1 Introduction
An apparently well established result in the theory of vertically diﬀerentiated
oligopoly states that earlier entrants supply goods of higher quality than
later entrants, in that the high-quality products earn higher profits than
low-quality alternatives (see, inter alia, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980;
Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992, 1995). A
general proof of this result for every convex fixed-cost function of quality
improvement is provided by Lehmann-Grube (1997).1
Two basic assumptions are at the basis of this result. The first is that
consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality is uniformly distributed
over a given support. Since the density of consumers (i.e., demand) is the
same at any income level, the top-quality market niche is the most profitable.
Therefore, in a static game, firms obviously prefer to enter with a product
characterised by the highest possible quality.
The second assumption concerns the time horizon considered in the above
mentioned literature. Entry in a vertically diﬀerentiated market is usually
analyzed within a single-period extensive form game. However, if one models
the entry problem in an explicit dynamic setup, an obvious trade-oﬀ imme-
diately appears, even maintaining the previous assumption. In order to enter
with an high quality product, the firm has to wait for the R&D activity to
take place and consequently it looses monopoly profits. However, postpon-
ing entry, the firm is able to produce a higher quality good, obtaining thus
higher profits. A static model does not allow to assess the possibility that
there exists such a trade-oﬀ between early innovation and the attainment of
a dominant position in the market.
Although it is generally asserted that quality may result from firms’ R&D
1Aoki and Prusa (1997) adopt a specific case of the cost function analysed by Lehmann-
Grube (1997), to investigate the consequences on profits, consumer surplus and social
welfare of the timing of investment in product quality in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly
where the market stage is played in the price space. To this regard, see also Lambertini
(1999).
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eﬀorts, this aspect of vertical product diﬀerentiation has received a relatively
scanty attention, the development phase being summarised by a cost function
which does not account for the time elapsed before the good is produced and
then marketed. To our knowledge, relevant contributions dealing explicitly
with the R&D activity are Beath et al. (1987); Motta (1992); Rosenkranz
(1995, 1997) and Dutta et al. (1995). These papers investigate the incentive
towards R&D cooperation (Motta, 1992; Rosenkranz, 1995) and the relation-
ship between R&D and the persistence of quality leadership (Beath et al.,
1987; Rosenkranz, 1997). Dutta et al. (1995) analyse strategic timing in the
adoption of a new technology leading to product diﬀerentiation and quality
improvements. All of these papers maintain that being the quality leader
(i.e., supplying the highest quality in the market) entails higher profits than
the rivals.
We present a simple model of vertical diﬀerentiation focusing upon the
trade-oﬀ between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low
quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a su-
perior product. We retain the assumption of a uniform income distribution,
that would make it profitable to produce a high quality good in a static game,
but relax the assumption of a static extensive form game. Namely, in our
model there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a lower
quality than the follower, for a large set of parameter values.2
This highlights that an unfavourable position in duopoly (or oligopoly),
due to a lower quality than the rivals’, may well be more than balanced by the
monopoly rent enjoyed ad interim with lower development costs. Therefore,
it appears that the established wisdom stating that early entry goes along
with high quality (and profits) is not robust to a fully fledged investigation
of the role of calendar time in shaping endogenously firms’ incentives.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model
2From a diﬀerent setting, Dutta et al. (1995) also derive an equilibrium where the first
entrant produces a lower quality than the second entrant. However, in their model the
later entrant makes more profits. As it will become clear in the remainder, this conclusion
rests upon the shape of the cost function.
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of vertical diﬀerentiation is laid out in section 2. Section 3 describes the
solution of all admissible subgames. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the
whole game is derived in section 4. Finally, section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a market for vertically diﬀerentiated products. Let this market
exist over time t, with t ∈ [0,∞). Two single-product firms, labelled 1 and
2, produce goods of diﬀerent qualities, q1 and q2 ∈ [0,∞), through the same
technology. Without loss of generality we can assume that firms production
costs are nought, while development costs are
Ci(qi) = c
Z q+qi
q
e−rtdt (1)
with i = 1, 2 and q ≥ 0. Development costs Ci(qi) are evaluated at the
beginning of the period of investment, therefore in 0 for firm 1 and in t1 for
firm 2. As usual, these costs can be interpreted as fixed cost due to the R&D
eﬀort needed to produce a certain quality. We characterize the technology
represented by the above cost function as follows:
Assumption 1 The R&D costs are constant over time and equal to c. If
firm i searches for a period of length ti, then it can produce a good at
most of quality ti and any other lower quality. Once entered into the
market the firm cannot invest anymore in R&D.
The above amounts to assuming that any change in the quality level
implies adjustment costs if and only if the change takes the form of a quality
increase. Conversely, once firm i has borne the cost of developing a given
quality, she may decide to decrease the quality of her product costlessly. For
the sake of simplicity we assume that quality is strictly correlated with the
time of entry. More precisely, if firm 1 enters at time t1, its maximum feasible
quality is t1 = q1. Firm 2’s cost of imitation, however, are exactly equal
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to the costs of innovation.3 Therefore, firm 2’s time of entry satisfies the
equality t2 = q1+ q2. In the remainder, we shall label the first entrant as the
leader. Firm 2 enters at date t2 ∈ [t1,∞), and we shall refer to her as the
follower.
Assumption 2 Products are oﬀered on a market where consumers have unit
demands, and buy if and only if the net surplus derived from consump-
tion vθ(qk, pi(qk)) = θqk − pi(qk) ≥ 0, where pi(qk) is the unit price
charged by firm i on a good of quality qk, purchased by a generic con-
sumer whose marginal willingness to pay is θ ∈ [θ, θ¯], with θ = θ¯ − 1.
We assume that θ is uniformly distributed with density one over such
interval, so that the total mass of consumer is one. Throughout the
following analysis, we assume partial market coverage.
The above assumption is rather common in vertically diﬀerentiated prod-
uct models. More relevant are the assumptions relative to the timing of the
game.
Assumption 3 Firm 1 chooses when to enter the market with the new prod-
uct and simultaneously chooses the quality and the price to be oﬀered.
Then firm 2 decides whether to imitate firm 1 and when to enter the
market. Once firm 2 has entered, the two firms choose simultaneously
the quality levels, which become common knowledge. Finally both firms
choose simultaneously the price levels.
This timing can be justified as follows. Suppose that firm 1 has invented
a new product, but it has to decide the quality level of that product before
entry. Since nobody knows the existence of this new product, only firm 1
can enter first. Thereafter, other firms can imitate firm 1. Suppose only firm
2 has the necessary technology. However, firm 2 has to sustain the R&D
3The case for very high imitation costs is supported by empirical findings (see Mansfield
et al., 1981; and Levin et al., 1987).
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costs before being able to enter and this takes time and precisely the period
between t1 and t2.
4
3 Solution of the Game
As usual we will solve the game backwards. However, it is useful before
solving the model to introduce two definitions, concerning firms’ behavior.
In the remainder, we shall refer to the first entrant (firm 1) as the leader,
and to the second entrant (firm 2) as the follower. We are going to examine
two alternative perspectives:
A. The follower enters at t2 with a product whose quality is lower than the
leader’s. We label this case as high-quality leadership.
B. The follower enters at t2 with a product whose quality is higher than the
leader’s. We label this case as low-quality leadership.
3.1 The Price Game
In both cases, over t ∈ [t2,∞), firms compete in prices. We borrow from
Aoki and Prusa (1997) and Lehmann-Grube (1997) the assumption that
downstream Bertrand competition is simultaneous. Market demands for the
high- and low-quality good are, respectively:
xH = θ¯ −
pH − pL
qH − qL
and xL =
pH − pL
qH − qL
− pL
qL
(2)
Duopoly revenue functions are RH = pHxH and RL = pLxL. Solving for the
equilibrium prices, we obtain:
pH = 2θ¯qH
qH − qL
4qH − qL
; pL = θ¯qL
qH − qL
4qH − qL
(3)
4To solve the game we adopt subgame perfection, and we look for simultaneous Nash
equilibria in each stage. Considering the Stackelberg solution would make calculations
more cumbersome without aﬀecting significantly the main results.
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which allow to rewrite the revenue function of firms in terms of qualities only,
as follows:5
RH =
4θ¯
2
q2H(qH − qL)
(4qH − qL)2
(4)
RL =
θ¯
2
qHqL(qH − qL)
(4qH − qL)2
(5)
On the basis of expressions (4-5), previous literature, dealing with single-
period models, establishes that the first entrant would choose to supply the
high-quality good, given that RH > RL. In the remainder, we label the
leader’s quality as q1 and the follower’s quality as either qH or qL, with the
understanding that qH ≥ q1 and q1 ≥ qL.
3.2 The Follower’s Quality Choice
We determine the conditions which induce the follower to enter either with
a lower or with a higher quality than the leader. We will define the two
situations entry from below and entry form above, and will be analyzed in a
sequel.
3.2.1 Entry from below
The follower’s profits when entering from below are:
Π2L =
Z ∞
q1+qL
RLe
−rtdt− c
Z q1+qL
q1
e−rtdt =
RL
e−(q1+qL)r
r
− c
r
¡
e−q1r − e−(q1+qL)r
¢
which using (5) can be rewritten as:
R2L (qL, q1) =
θ¯
2
q1qL(q1 − qL)
(4q1 − qL)2
e−(q1+qL)r
r
− c
r
¡
e−q1r − e−(q1+qL)r
¢
=
θ¯
2
r
e−rq1
µ
q1qL(q1 − qL)
(4q1 − qL)2
e−rqL +
c
θ¯
2 e
−rqL − c
θ¯
2
¶
5The proof is omitted here, as it is provided by several authors (Gabszewicz and Thisse,
1979; Choi and Shin, 1992; Motta, 1993; Aoki and Prusa, 1997; Lehmann-Grube, 1997).
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and setting γ ≡ c
θ¯
2 , γq˜L ≡ qL and γq˜1 ≡ q1, and substituting, we obtain:
r
c
R2L (γq˜L, γq˜1) =
µµ
q˜1q˜L(q˜1 − q˜L)
(4q˜1 − q˜L)2
+ 1
¶
e−δq˜L − 1
¶
e−δq˜1 (6)
where δ ≡ γr ≡ rc/θ¯2. Diﬀerentiating (6) for q˜L we obtain the first order
condition:
−e−δ(q˜1+q˜L)·
(7q˜L − 4q˜1) (q˜1)2 + δq˜1q˜L (q˜1 − q˜L) (4q˜1 − q˜L) + δ (4q˜1 − q˜L)3
(4q˜1 − q˜L)3
= 0
If we set q˜L = xq˜1, the numerator becomes:
q˜31
¡
7x− 4 + δq˜1x (1− x) (4− x) + δ (4− x)3
¢
= 0
hence:
q˜1 =
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δx (1− x) (4− x) (7)
and:
q˜L = xq˜1 =
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δ (1− x) (4− x)
Remark 1 The follower entering with the low quality chooses the following
quality level:
argmaxR2L (γq˜L, γq˜1) =
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δ (1− x) (4− x) ≡ q˜
∗
L
where x ≡ qL/q1 and δ ≡ cr/θ¯
2
.
Notice that in order to have q˜L ≥ 0 we must impose
δ ≤ 4− 7x
(4− x)3
(8)
which in turn implies:
0 ≤ x ≤ 4
7
≈ 0.571 43, (9)
and correspondigly:
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
16
= 0.062 5. (10)
Moreover:
∂q˜L
∂x
=
−8− x− 7x (1− x)− δ (x+ 2) (4− x)3
δ (1− x)2 (4− x)2
< 0
hence q˜L is a monotonically decreasing function in the relevant range.
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3.2.2 Entry from above
Follower’s profits if it enters with the high quality good are:
Π2H = RH
Z ∞
q1+qH
e−rtdt− c
Z q1+qH
q1
e−rtdt
RH
e−t2r
r
− c
r
¡
e−q1r − e−(q1+qH)r
¢
which using (4) can be re-written as follows
R2H (qH , q1) =
4θ¯
2
q2H(qH − q1)
(4qH − q1)2
e−(q1+qH)r
r
− c
r
¡
e−q1r − e−(q1+qH)r
¢
=
θ¯
2
r
µ
4q2H(qH − q1)
(4qH − q1)2
e−rqH +
c
θ¯
2 e
−rqH − c
θ¯
2
¶
e−rq1 .
Then, setting γ ≡ c/θ¯2, γq˜L ≡ qL and γq˜1 ≡ q1 we obtain:
r
c
R2H (γq˜H , γq˜1) =
µµ
4q˜2H(q˜H − q˜1)
(4q˜H − q˜1)2
+ 1
¶
e−δq˜H − 1
¶
e−δq˜1 (11)
where δ ≡ γr ≡ rc/θ¯2. Diﬀerentiating (11) for q˜H we obtain the first order
condition:
−e−δ(q˜1+q˜H)·¡
(4q˜H − q˜1)3 + 4q˜2H (q˜H − q˜1) (4q˜H − q˜1)
¢
δ − 4q˜H (4q˜2H − 3q˜H q˜1 + 2q˜21)
(4q˜H − q˜1)3
= 0
If we set q˜1 = xq˜H , the numerator becomes:
q˜3H
¡
4δ (1− x) (4− x) q˜H − 4
¡
4− 3x+ 2x2
¢
+ δ (4− x)3
¢
which is nought if:
q˜H =
4 (4− 3x+ 2x2)− δ (4− x)3
4δ (4− x) (1− x) . (12)
Hence, the following holds:
Remark 2 The follower entering with the high quality chooses the following
quality level:
argmaxR2H (γq˜H , γq˜1) =
4 (4− 3x+ 2x2)− δ (4− x)3
4δ (4− x) (1− x) ≡ q˜
∗
H .
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Notice that in order to have q˜H ≥ 0 we must impose:
0 ≤ δ ≤ 4(4− 3x+ 2x
2)
(4− x)3
(13)
Moreover,
∂q˜H
∂x
=
1
4
4 (8 + x+ 7x (1− x))− (x+ 2) (4− x)3 δ
δ (1− x)2 (4− x)2
It is easy to check that:
∂
∂x
q˜H
µ
x|δ = 4(4−3x+2x
2)
(4−x)3
¶
=
2x (x+ 5)
(4− x)2 (1− x) δ
> 0.
Hence, noticing that ∂q˜H/∂x is decreasing in δ, we have that ∂q˜H/∂x > 0 in
the relevant range. Therefore, q˜H (x) is monotonically increasing.
3.3 The Leader’s Quality Choice
The leader has to take two choices on the quality level: one when it enters
as a monopolist and the other when it has to cope with the entry of the
competitor. On the basis of Assumption 1, the second level of quality cannot
exceed the monopoly one. As usual, we start by analyzing the last quality
choice, that when the follower enters.
3.3.1 The Quality in the Last Stage Game
As for the follower, we determine the conditions inducing the follower to enter
either with a lower or with a higher quality than the leader’s. We will define
the two situations as entry from below and entry form above, and they will
be analyzed in a sequel.
Entry from above First of all notice that once firm 2 has entered, firm
1 wishes to produce at the highest quality level in the product space. It is
suﬃcient to compute the derivative of RH with respect to qH and check that
it is always positive:
∂
∂qH
RH = 4θ¯
2
qH
4q2H − 3qHq2 + 2q22
(4qH − q2)3
9
which is positive if: 4q2H − 3qHq2 + 2q22 > 0. However:
4q2H − 3qHq2 + 2q22 ≥ 4q22 − 3q2q2 + 2q22 = 3q22 ≥ 0
where the first inequality is an implication of qH ≥ q2. Since q1 ≤ qM , where
qM is the quality level of monopolist’s product, we can summarize the result
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the leader enters with the high quality good, then it will
produce a good of the same quality level after and before follower’s entry.
Entry from below After firm 2 entered the market, the leader’s optimal
quality level is q1 = 4qH/7, if it entered with a low quality. In fact:
∂
∂qL
RL = θ¯
2
q2H
4qH − 7q1
(4qH − q1)3
which implies the assertion.
Moreover, q1 = 4qH/7 implies q˜1 = 4q˜H/7, therefore if we substitute in
the follower’s first order condition we obtain:
C2H
µ
q˜H ,
4
7
q˜H
¶
= −288
343
(+7δq˜H + 48δ − 14) q˜3H = 0
whose solution is:
q˜H =
2
7
7− 24δ
δ
(14)
which is meaningful if and only if
δ =
c
θ¯
2 r ≤
7
24
' 0.29167 (15)
Under the above condition we have:
q˜1 =
8
49
7− 24δ
δ
(16)
This discussion implies:
Proposition 4 If the leader entered with the low quality good and if the
quality chosen after the follower has entered is lower than that chosen in the
monopoly phase, the equilibrium quality levels when the followers enters are:
q˜1 =
8
49
7− 24δ
δ
, q˜2 =
2
7
7− 24δ
δ
(17)
provided that: δ = cr/θ¯
2 ≤ 7/24.
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3.3.2 Monopoly Phase
After having discussed the choices in the competition game, we have to de-
scribe what happens in the monopoly phase. As usual, we start by describing
the price policy and then the choice of quality, distinguishing the entry with
high and low quality respectively.
The Monopolist’s Price In the monopoly phase, revenues are RM =
p
¡
θ¯− p/qM), where qM is the quality level chosen by firm 1 when monopolist.
The first order conditions for the price is:
θ¯qM − 2p
qM
= 0
and hence p = θ¯qM/2. Substituting again in the profits, it yields:
RM =
1
4
θ¯
2
qM
Entry from above. The profit function of firm 1 when entering from
above:
RM
R qM+qL
qM
e−rtdt+RH
R∞
qM+qL
e−rtdt− c
R qM
0
e−rtdt =
RM
e−rqM − e−(qM+qL)r
r
+RH
e−(qM+qL)r
r
− c(1− e
−rqM )
r
=
qM θ¯
2
4
e−rqM − e−(qM+qL)r
r
+
4θ¯
2
q2H(qH − qL)
(4qH − qL)2
e−(qM+qL)r
r
− c(1− e
−rqM )
r
which is equivalent to:
r
θ¯
2Π1H (qL, qM) = 4
q21 (q1 − qL)
(4q1 − qL)2
e−(qM+qL)r+
1
4
¡
1− e−qLr
¢
e−qMrqM −
c
θ¯
2
¡
1− e−qMr
¢
11
We already know from the above analysis that, when the follower enters,
the leader will produce the highest quality and hence we have q1 = qM .
Therefore, the leader maximizes:
ΠMH (qL, q1) = 4
q21 (q1 − qL)
(4q1 − qL)2
e−(q1+qL)r+
1
4
e−q1rq1−
1
4
e−(q1+qL)rq1+γe
−q1r−γ
with γ = c/θ¯
2
. Using the usual variable transformations, we obtain:
ΠMH (γq˜L, γq˜1) = γ
µ
4q˜21 (q˜1 − q˜L)
(4q˜1 − q˜L)2
e−δq˜L − 1
4
q˜1e
−δq˜L +
1
4
q˜1 + 1
¶
e−δq˜1 − γ
where δ = γr. Then, defining:
ΠH (q˜L, q˜1, δ) =
1
γ
ΠMH (γq˜L, γq˜1) + γ
and using q˜L = xq˜1, we obtain:
ΠH (xq˜1, q˜1, δ) =
1
4
µµ
1− 8 + x
(4− x)2
xe−δxq˜1
¶
q˜1 + 4
¶
e−δq˜1
Using (7) and substituting in the profit of the monopolist we obtain the
following expression:
ΠH
Ã
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δ (1− x) (4− x) ,
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δx (1− x) (4− x)
!
(18)
Therefore, the leader’s problem is formally equivalent to mazimizing (18)
with respect to x. Given restrictions (8− 10), we can carry out an exploration
of the monopolist profit function in Figure 1, highlighting the existence of a
global maximum for any given value of δ.
The monopolist’s first order condition:
DH (x, δ) =
∂
∂x
ΠH
Ã
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δ (1− x) (4− x) ,
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δx (1− x) (4− x)
!
= 0 (19)
cannot be solved analytically. However, we can draw the implicit plot in Fig-
ure 2. The dotted line plots the locus δ = (4− 7x) / (4− x)3. Accordingly,
the only meaningful area is the one below the dotted line. The continuous
line below the dotted one is the locus of the global maxima of the profit
function, as established by comparing Figure 1 and 2.
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Figure 1: Profit of the leader when entering from above
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Figure 2: First order condition for the leader when entering from above
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Entry from below The profit function of firm 1 when entering from below
is:
RM
R qM+qH
qM
e−rtdt+RL
R∞
qM+qH
e−rtdt− c
R qM
0
e−rtdt =
RM
e−rqM − e−(qM+qH)r
r
+RL
e−(qM+qH)r
r
− c1− e
−rqM
r
=
qM θ¯
2
4
e−rqM − e−(qM+qH)r
r
+ θ¯
2 qHqL (qH − q1)
(4qH − q1)2
e−(qM+qH)r
r
− c(1− e
−rqM )
r
.
This is equivalent to:
r
θ¯
2ΠML (qM , qH , qL) =
qHqL (qH − qL)
(4qH − qL)2
e−(qM+qH)r +
1
4
¡
1− e−qHr
¢
e−qMrqM − γ
¡
1− e−qMr
¢
where γ = c/θ¯
2
, as usual.
We have to distinguish two diﬀerent cases. In the first one, δ ≤ 7/24 and
therefore Proposition 4 holds. In the second one, δ > 7/24. Let us start from
the first case.
Case I: δ ≤ 7/24. Hence we can set:
q1 = γq˜1 =
8
49
7− 24rγ
r
, q2 = γq˜2 =
2
7
7− 24rγ
r
which can be substituted in the profit function to yield:
1
γ
ΠML
µ
γq˜M ,
2
7
7− 24rγ
r
,
8
49
7− 24rγ
r
¶
=
1
168
Ã
(7− 24δ − 42δq˜M) e(−2+
48
7
δ)
δ
+ 42 (q˜M + 4)
!
e−δq˜M − 1.
From the first order condition w.r.t. qM , we obtain:
q˜M =
1
42
(−49 + 24δ) e−2+ 487 δ + 42 (1− 4δ)
δ
³
1− e−2+ 487 δ
´
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Notice that above expression characterizes the leader’s choice when entering
with the low quality if qM ≥ q1 or q˜M (= qM/γ) ≥ q˜1 (= q1/γ), that is, if:
1
42
(−49 + 24δ) e−2+ 487 δ + 42 (1− 4δ)
δ
³
1− e−2+ 487 δ
´ − 8
49
7− 24δ
δ
≥ 0
which after some manipulation is equivalent to:
1
294
7e−2+
48
7
δ + 984e−2+
48
7
δδ + 42 + 24δ
δ
³
e−2+
48
7
δ − 1
´ ≥ 0
Since the numerator is always positive, the above condition implies that the
denominator should be positive, or equivalently that:
δ ≥ 7
24
' 0.291 67
and recalling Proposition 4 we know that the condition cannot be satisfied
for a positive quality level. We summarize the above analysis in the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 Irrespective of whether the leader enters with the low or the
high quality, the quality of the leader after the follower has entered the market
is equal to that of the monopoly phase, i.e., q1 = qM , if δ ≤ 7/24.
Case II: δ > 7/24. Now we analyze the situation where the monopolist’s
choice is binding in the duopoly phase. In such a case the leader’s profits,
after trivial transformation, become:
ΠML (qH , q1) =
µµ
qHq1 (qH − q1)
(4qH − q1)2
− 1
4
q1
¶
e−qHr +
1
4
q1 + γ
¶
e−q1r − γ
and after the usual variable transformations:
ΠML (γq˜H , γq˜1) = γ
µµ
q˜H q˜1
q˜H − q˜1
(4q˜H − q˜1)2
− 1
4
q˜1
¶
e−δq˜H +
1
4
q˜1 + 1
¶
e−δq˜1 − γ
where again δ = γr. Defining:
ΠL (q˜H , q˜1, δ) =
1
γ
ΠML (γq˜H , γq˜1) + γ
15
02
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Figure 3: Leader’s profit when entering from below
and setting q˜H = xq˜1, we obtain:
ΠL (q˜H , xq˜H , δ) =
1
4
µµ
1− 12− 4x+ x
2
(4− x)2
e−δq˜H
¶
xq˜H + 4
¶
e−δxq˜H
Recalling (12), the monopolist problem is equivalent to maximizing the fol-
lowing expression, with respect to x:
ΠL
Ã
4 (4− 3x+ 2x2)− δ (4− x)3
4δ (4− x) (1− x) , x
4 (4− 3x+ 2x2)− δ (4− x)3
4δ (4− x) (1− x)
!
(20)
Using restriction (13), we can produce a graphical exploration of the problem
in Figure 3. It shows that the function has a unique global maximum for
each value of δ.
Moreover, the first order condition is:
DL (x, δ) =(21)
∂
∂x
ΠL
Ã
4 (4− 3x+ 2x2)− δ (4− x)3
4δ (4− x) (1− x) , x
4 (4− 3x+ 2x2)− δ (4− x)3
4δ (4− x) (1− x)
!
= 0
and it is not solvable analytically. However, its implicit plot is in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Leader’s first order condition when entering from below
4 Is it Convenient to Enter the Market with
a High-quality Product?
Now we can solve for the subgame perfect equilibriumof the whole game by
determining whether the leader will enter with a high or a low quality. We
first prove a preliminary result.
Proposition 6 No equilibrium with the follower entering the market with a
lower quality than the leader does exist if δ = rc/θ¯
2
> 0.0625.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of (10).
We are now in the position to prove the main Lemma of this section.
Lemma 7 There exists a δ¯ such that, for δ ∈
£
0, δ¯
¢
there is no equilibrium
with the follower entering the market and the leader producing the lower
quality good, while for δ ∈
¡
δ¯, 0.0625
¤
there exists no equilibrium with the
follower entering the market and the leader producing the higher quality good.
The value of δ¯ is approximately: δ¯ = 0.0203125.
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Figure 5: Profits of firm 1 when entering with high (solid) and when entering
with low (dash) quality.
Proof. We solve numerically equations (19) and (21), finding the optimal
x for the two problems for various values of δ. The computed values are
reported in the Table 1-3 of the Appendix in columns denoted respectively
by xHL and xLH . By using (7) we can compute q˜1 and q˜L = xq˜1, the optimal
values of transformed variables replacing qL and q1. By using (12) we can
compute, instead, q˜H and q˜1 = x · q˜H . Given the various level of qualities, the
profits of the monopolist entering from above and entering from below can
be computed and are drawn in Figure 5. It can be seen that the profit of the
high quality monopolist are higher for lower level of δ and lower thereafter.
The two curves cross at δ¯.
The two levels of the follower’s profits, RL when it chooses a lower quality
than the leader’s and RH when it chooses a higher quality, are represented in
the following two figures. The first one represents the two variables when the
leader tries to enter with a higher quality than the follower and, as we can
see, the best response for the follower consists in choosing a higher quality.
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In the second Figure, instead, we represent the two follower’s profit levels
when the leader tries to enter with a low quality. In this case, we see that
the response of the follower is consistent with the leader’s strategy.
The above Lemma allows us to infer that, in our model, the leader enters
with the high quality only if it can block the follower’s entry. Therefore,
here we may have only two types of equilibria. In the first one the leader
invests in R&D in such a way to be able to maintain its monopoly position.
In the second type of equilibrium, the leader enters with the low quality and
then the follower enters with a higher quality. The following proposition will
exclude the first outcome, that where the leader can have a monopoly power.
Proposition 8 For δ suﬃciently small, there exists no equilibrium where
the leader succeeds in pre-emptying the market. In particular, δ ≤ 1/16 is a
suﬃcient condition for the leader not to be able to pre-empt the market.
Proof. In order to prove the Proposition, we must check that he follower
can always enter with a lower quality for any choice of the leader, making
positive profits. Recall that the optimal choice of the follower is expressed
by (7), which is re-written for convenience:
q˜L =
4− 7x− δ (4− x)3
δ (1− x) (4− x)
We know that x must satisfy inequality (8):
δ ≤ 4− 7x
(4− x)3
Recall also that profits for the follower entering with the low quality are:
r
c
R2L (γq˜L, γq˜1) =
µµ
q˜1q˜L(q˜1 − q˜L)
(4q˜1 − q˜L)2
+ 1
¶
e−δq˜L − 1
¶
e−δq˜1
and using again the definition of q˜L and the fact that q˜L = xq˜1, profits can
be re-written as: µ
4− 7x
(4− x)3 δ
e
− 4−7x−δ(4−x)
3
(1−x)(4−x) − 1
¶
e−δq˜1
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Notice that if (8) is satisfied as an equality, then the follower profits are
nought, otherwise profits are positive for any value of x and δ.
The only possible equilibria left are those with the leader entering with the
low quality and the follower responding with a higher one and the other where
the opposite happens, depending on the value of the composite parameter δ.
However, we still have to ascertain whether it is optimal for the follower to
respond with a higher (lower) quality if the leader enters with a low (high)
one. This is done in the following two propositions.
Proposition 9 If δ ∈
£
0, δ¯
¢
the leader enters with a high quality and the
follower will always respond with a lower one.
Proof. This proof is conceptually similar to the previous one. On the basis
of Lemma 7, we can compute q1 and qL. With the two levels of quality we
can compute numerically Firm’s 2 profit as from equation (6). Moreover,
using the first order condition of the follower when entering from above (12),
we can compute numerically the corresponding value of x, for any given q1
and δ and hence qH = q1/x. Those values of x are reported in the tables
of the Appendix in the column denoted as xHH . Finally, we use q1 and qH
to compute the follower’s profit when deviating and entering with the high
quality using (11). We provide here the graphical representation of the two
levels of profit of the follower showing that the follower never deviates from
the low quality.
Proposition 10 If δ ∈
³
δ¯, δ
i
, the leader enters with a low quality and the
follower will always respond with a higher one, while for
³
δ, 0.0625
i
, there
is no equilibrium (in pure strategies) since the follower has an incentive to
undercut the leader’s quality.
Proof. Relying on the proof of Lemma 7, we can compute q1 and qH . With
the two levels of quality we can compute numerically Firm’s 2 profit as from
equation (11). Moreover, using the first order condition of the follower when
entering from below (7), we can compute numerically the appropriate value of
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Figure 6: The leader enters with the high quality. Follower’s profits when
choosing the low one (solid) and the high one (dots).
x, for any given q1 and δ, and hence qL = xq1. Those values of x are reported
in the tables of the Appendix in the column denoted as xLL. Finally, we use
q1 and qL to compute the follower’s profit when deviating and entering with
the low quality using (6). We provide here the graphical representation of
the two profit levels of the follower showing that the follower never deviates
from the high quality, which shows that the follower’s profit are higher when
entering with the high quality, except fo very high values of δ.
A few remarks are now in order. First, a trivial one, refers to δ = δ¯. For
that value of δ both equilibria hold. Second, recall that δ = rc/θ¯
2
. The two
Propositions 9 and 10 together imply that in the interval
h
0, δ
i
, for low δ the
leader will enter with high quality, while with high ones he will choose a low
quality. That is, the leader will enter with the high quality for low levels of
r and with the low quality for high levels of r, for given c and θ¯. Since a low
r implies a high discount rate, the result has a very intuitive explanation: a
patient monopolist will enter later in order to obtain a better qulity, while
impatient ones will enter earlier, even at the cost of choosing a low quality.
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Figure 7: The leader enters with the low quality. Follower’s profits when
choosing the high one (solid) and the low one (dots).
It is also rather intuitive that c, the cost of investing in quality, has the same
eﬀects as r: a high c makes the monopolist impatient. On the contrary,
the consumers’ willingness to pay for quality, summarized by θ¯, has opposite
eﬀects, since the strategy of waiting for a higher quality has higher returns.
Third, we should like to assess our results against those of Lehmann-Grube
(1997) and Dutta et al. (1995), so as to evaluate how diﬀerent assumptions
about the time horizon and the technology aﬀect the features of the sub-
game perfect equilibrium. Lehmann-Grube (1997) generalises the analisys
conducted by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) to account for a technology
which is convex in the quality level, but remains in a single-period model
where there esists no monopoly phase. This produces the result that surplus
extraction is maximised when the firm locates at the top of the available
quality spectrum.
In Dutta et al. (1995), it is assumed that (i) per-period operative duopoly
profits are proportional to relative quality and are symmetric; (ii) adoption
(entry) dates are endogenous, while (iii) the growth of quality over time is
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not endogenously determined by firms; (iv) unit production cost is flat w.r.t.
quality; and (v) innovation costs are summarised by the waiting time before
the adoption. In this setup, the authors find that a later entrant obtains
larger profits than an earlier entrant, and no monopoly rent is dissipated at
the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In our setting, the entry timing is endogenously linked to quality improve-
ment, and the cost borne to supply superior qualities can be high enough to
oﬀset the advantage attached to serving rich customers. The interplay of
these factors may entail that, in some relevant parameter ranges, all firms
would prefer to enter early with an inferior quality rather than late with a
superior one.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the bearings of R&D expenditures in continuous time
over the entry process in a market for vertically diﬀerentiated goods.
We have shown that entering first and enjoying an ad interim monopoly
rent may counterbalance the incentive towards the supply of high quality
goods in duopoly after the entry of a second innovator. Indeed, we have
proved that this is the only subgame perfect equilibrium in a large range of
parameters.
The foregoing analysis shows that the established wisdom produced by
previous literature in this field does not properly account for the role of time
and its interaction with R&D technology in determining firms’ incentives.
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Appendix
Table 1: Numerical solutions for low δ’s.
Entry from below Entry from above
δ xLH xLL xHL xHH
0.000625 0.5710955777 0.4252061589 0.4237058956 0.2092704695
0.001250 0.5710989664 0.4215844866 0.4203553403 0.2074909267
0.001875 0.5711018893 0.4179537220 0.4169942492 0.2056948230
0.002500 0.5711043377 0.4143137629 0.4136224093 0.2038821871
0.003125 0.5711063032 0.4106645062 0.4102396054 0.2020530634
0.003750 0.5711077769 0.4070058473 0.4068456203 0.2002074979
0.004375 0.5711087500 0.4033376809 0.4034402348 0.1983455435
0.005000 0.5711092133 0.3996598999 0.4000232276 0.1964672625
0.005625 0.5711091574 0.3959723970 0.3965943754 0.1945727202
0.006250 0.5711085732 0.3922750625 0.3931534528 0.1926619948
0.006875 0.5711074507 0.3885677869 0.3897002322 0.1907351684
0.007500 0.5711057807 0.3848504580 0.3862344841 0.1887923325
0.008125 0.5711035528 0.3811229631 0.3827559768 0.1868335893
0.008750 0.5711007573 0.3773851884 0.3792644768 0.1848590436
0.009375 0.5710973838 0.3736370179 0.3757597481 0.1828688159
0.010000 0.5710934220 0.3698783352 0.3722415530 0.1808630310
0.010625 0.5710888610 0.3661090221 0.3687096516 0.1788418249
0.011250 0.5710836905 0.3623289590 0.3651638019 0.1768053412
0.011875 0.5710778990 0.3585380248 0.3616037600 0.1747537347
0.012500 0.5710714757 0.3547360970 0.3580292799 0.1726871712
0.013125 0.5710644090 0.3509230515 0.3544401135 0.1706058225
0.013750 0.5710566875 0.3470987630 0.3508360106 0.1685098810
26
0.014375 0.5710482994 0.3432631042 0.3472167191 0.1663995359
0.015000 0.5710392326 0.3394159465 0.3435819850 0.1642749982
0.015625 0.5710294752 0.3355571593 0.3399315520 0.1621364858
0.016250 0.5710190143 0.3316866107 0.3362651620 0.1599842274
0.016875 0.5710078378 0.3278041673 0.3325825548 0.1578184683
0.017500 0.5709959325 0.3239096932 0.3288834683 0.1556394605
0.018125 0.5709832856 0.3200030513 0.3251676384 0.1534474724
0.018750 0.5709698835 0.3160841028 0.3214347991 0.1512427825
0.019375 0.5709557124 0.3121527066 0.3176846822 0.1490256846
0.020000 0.5709407591 0.3082087198 0.3139170180 0.1467964828
0.020625 0.5709250091 0.3042519977 0.3101315343 0.1445554960
27
Table 2: Numerical solutions for intermediate δ’s.
Entry from below Entry from above
δ xLH xLL xHL xHH
0.021250 0.5709084481 0.3002823939 0.3063279576 0.1423030611
0.021875 0.5708910616 0.2962997593 0.3025060119 0.1400395220
0.022500 0.5708728346 0.2923039433 0.2986654198 0.1377652416
0.023125 0.5708537521 0.2882947929 0.2948059018 0.1354805970
0.023750 0.5708337985 0.2842721533 0.2909271764 0.1331859775
0.024375 0.5708129580 0.2802358667 0.2870289604 0.1308817922
0.025000 0.5707912150 0.2761857738 0.2831109687 0.1285684678
0.025625 0.5707685527 0.2721217130 0.2791729145 0.1262464329
0.026250 0.5707449547 0.2680435198 0.2752145090 0.1239161526
0.026875 0.5707204040 0.2639510277 0.2712354616 0.1215780901
0.027500 0.5706948832 0.2598440676 0.2672354799 0.1192327367
0.028125 0.5706683748 0.2557224678 0.2632142698 0.1168805932
0.028750 0.5706408607 0.2515860543 0.2591715353 0.1145221874
0.029375 0.5706123228 0.2474346499 0.2551069787 0.1121580586
0.030000 0.5705827422 0.2432680753 0.2510203005 0.1097887570
0.030625 0.5705521000 0.2390861482 0.2469111995 0.1074148657
0.031250 0.5705203767 0.2348886833 0.2427793726 0.1050369829
0.031875 0.5704875525 0.2306754927 0.2386245150 0.1026557079
0.032500 0.5704536073 0.2264463850 0.2344463204 0.1002716774
0.033125 0.5704185202 0.2222011666 0.2302444803 0.0978855505
0.033750 0.5703822707 0.2179396398 0.2260186850 0.0954979899
0.034375 0.5703448369 0.2136616045 0.2217686227 0.0931096840
0.035000 0.5703061971 0.2093668569 0.2174939800 0.0907213469
28
0.035625 0.5702663289 0.2050551901 0.2131944419 0.0883337068
0.036250 0.5702252095 0.2007263935 0.2088696914 0.0859475081
0.036875 0.5701828157 0.1963802531 0.2045194100 0.0835635313
0.037500 0.5701391237 0.1920165513 0.2001432774 0.0811825600
0.038125 0.5700941095 0.1876350669 0.1957409718 0.0788054078
0.038750 0.5700477480 0.1832355747 0.1913121692 0.0764329080
0.039375 0.5700000141 0.1788178457 0.1868565444 0.0740659098
0.040000 0.5699508820 0.1743816469 0.1823737701 0.0717052971
0.040625 0.5699003253 0.1699267414 0.1778635173 0.0693519571
0.041250 0.5698483171 0.1654528876 0.1733254556 0.0670068124
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Table 3: Numerical solutions for high δ’s.
Entry from below Entry from above
δ xLH xLL xHL xHH
0.041875 0.5697948299 0.1609598402 0.1687592523 0.0646707925
0.042500 0.5697398357 0.1564473490 0.1641645734 0.0623448659
0.043125 0.5696833057 0.1519151595 0.1595410828 0.0600300129
0.043750 0.5696252105 0.1473630125 0.1548884429 0.0577272307
0.044375 0.5695655203 0.1427906439 0.1502063139 0.0554375448
0.045000 0.5695042043 0.1381977848 0.1454943546 0.0531619999
0.045625 0.5694412313 0.1335841613 0.1407522217 0.0509016549
0.046250 0.5693765691 0.1289494940 0.1359795701 0.0486575954
0.046875 0.5693101851 0.1242934986 0.1311760528 0.0464309355
0.047500 0.5692420458 0.1196158850 0.1263413209 0.0442227972
0.048125 0.5691721169 0.1149163575 0.1214750236 0.0420343272
0.048750 0.5691003633 0.1101946149 0.1165768081 0.0398666744
0.049375 0.5690267493 0.1054503495 0.1116463198 0.0377210423
0.050000 0.5689512381 0.1006832480 0.1066832018 0.0355986197
0.050625 0.5688737922 0.0958929905 0.1016870953 0.0335006319
0.051250 0.5687943732 0.0910792507 0.0966576396 0.0314283115
0.051875 0.5687129417 0.0862416955 0.0915944716 0.0293829044
0.052500 0.5686294573 0.0813799851 0.0864972263 0.0273656750
0.053125 0.5685438792 0.0764937725 0.0813655364 0.0253779143
0.053750 0.5684561647 0.0715827035 0.0761990324 0.0234209261
0.054375 0.5683662708 0.0666464162 0.0709973427 0.0214960158
0.055000 0.5682741531 0.0616845411 0.0657600932 0.0196044799
0.055625 0.5681797662 0.0566967009 0.0604869077 0.0177476705
30
0.056250 0.5680830636 0.0516825096 0.0551774074 0.0159268892
0.056875 0.5679839975 0.0466415730 0.0498312113 0.0141435302
0.057500 0.5678825190 0.0415734883 0.0444479358 0.0123989271
0.058125 0.5677785781 0.0364778434 0.0390271949 0.0106944486
0.058750 0.5676721233 0.0313542170 0.0335686000 0.0090314093
0.059375 0.5675631020 0.0262021781 0.0280717598 0.0074112368
0.060000 0.5674514598 0.0210212859 0.0225362806 0.0058352248
0.060625 0.5673371415 0.0158110892 0.0169617657 0.0043047257
0.061250 0.5672200899 0.0105711263 0.0113478159 0.0028211172
0.061875 0.5671002466 0.0053009246 0.0056940290 0.0013857253
31
